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Approved for Release ENDOTENDENT HELEREPROPERT NO.

INFORMATION REPORT

CD NO.

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COUNTRY

Germany

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SUBJECT

Problem of Discipline in the East Zone Police Force

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DATE OF INFO. 25X1X

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SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO.



- 1. After expounding the basic and well-known communist concepts of the role played by the Volkspolizei under the new antifascist-democratic order and setting forth the political objectives that should be pursued in indoctrinating its members, the writer of the directive proceeds to dwell on the requirements of enforced discipline.
- 2. "Strengthening of discipline and political indoctrination.

The Volkspolizei can discharge its functions in the aforementioned sense (i.e. by way of attaining the political objectives which it is required to set itself) only if, besides the strengthening of the discipline of the Volkspolizei, a thorough political indoctrination is performed. Both are inseparable and should not be opposed, else they would fail in their purpose as applied to the Volkspolizei. Consequently it would be wrong to defer measures designed to raise the level of training and discipline until political indoctrination has reached a certain stage. Political consciousness and strict discipline must be brought about in all organs of the Volkspolizei and with all its members at the same time.

## 3. Wrong Concepts.

"The importance of strengthening discipline and the intensification of basic training meet with a partial lack of understanding by the Volkspolizei. Only subversive elements and
agents opposing us can say that there is no need for superiors
and command power. The talk about 'voluntary discipline' betrays an absolutely false interpretation of the term 'discipline'.
Behind it hides the endeavor to make the application of discipline dependent on a discretionary decision of the individual

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and to decide upon its enforcement from case to case, thus effectively dissolving all discipline. It is a matter of course that no pacifist views can be tolerated in the Volkspolizei. The Volkspolizei cannot fulfill its tasks without
good weapons training and without resolute use of its weapons
against reactionary plots and anti-social crime. The cry raised in the camp of domestic and foreign imperialists and warmongers and their criminal hirelings about the militarism alleged to prevail in the Volkspolizel demonstrates that they fear the Volkapolizei as a secure protection of the democratic order.

"Falling behind of service training intolerable.

"At present the greatest danger lies in the falling behind of service training inasmuch as its current state jeopardizes the whole use of the police. Without rapid and thoroughgoing improvement of training a cituation could arise in which the police apparatu« could no longer cope with its tasks. Whoever opposes better discipline and all-round service training in the Volkspolizei adopts a position as backward as that held by a worker who doe not share in the increase of work productivity in the sector of the national economy that is owned by the people. For the very reason that the Volkspolizel is filled with a new democratic apirit and because its tasks serve the interests of the working population, must its discipline and training be pushed to a much higher plane than ever before.

"Straigh: forward indoctrination corresponding with the character of the Volkepolizei.

"In order to improve the political and ideological indoctrination the general level of the Polit/Kultur officials and the systematic discharge of their activities has to be improved. Participation in state political instruction must be 100%; otherwise a Volks-polizist whose political consciousness is not highly developed will not be able to fulfill his function as dispenser of democracy and culture among the population. In particular will it be necessary to weld the Volkspolizei into an instrument of the present anti-facciet democratic order by means of straight-forward indoctrination (Ausrichtung). The Volkspolizei is neither a party nor a trade union nor any other democratic mass organization, but an institution of the state or the community.

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Comment: The above report is a significant manifestation of an intramural clash of opinions resulting from the militarization of the police in the East Zone.

reported on this rift which derives from the fact that neither the rank and file of the SED following nor the old Bolshevicte in its ranks appear to be by any means reconciled to a resuscitation of Prussian militarism under the guise of an anti-fascist democratic Volkspolizei. The German Communist movement has not experienced in its recent history the transmutation from internationalism to nationalism which the Russian Communist party underwent in the course of the late war with Germany. Elements that went into discard when Stalin destroyed the remnants of the old Bolshevist guard still linger in the ranks of the German party. Against them the strictures, ostensibly aimed at the proponents of discretionary enforcement of discipline and pacifism, are actually directed. The latter have entrenched themselves in the corps of Polit/Kultur functionaries and represent a constant thorn in the side of the professional German officers entrusted with the militarization of the Volkspolizei. From the

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beginning it became clear that the Russian control element was determined to see the paramilitary Bereitschaften trained and operated along strictly military lines. The Polit/Kultur element, at least within the framework of the Berlin Bereitschaften, soon found itself out of step with the thinking of the military faction headed by President of Police Paul Markgraf, backed by Colonel Zhukov and his staff representing the Central Komendatura of Berlin. It should be noted that the document commented upon was presumably drafted by Vice President Gypner, a prominent KPD old-timer. This taken in conjunction with the fact that Walter Ulbricht is generally credited with the reorganization of the Volkspolizei, prominently featuring the recall of professional German officers from Soviet POW camps to head its paramilitary units, suggests that the pro-military faction within the SED leadership may not necessarily be confined exclusively to the older class.

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